Test Bank

Chapter 16: Consequences of Democratic Institutions

Majoritarian or Consensus Democracy?

1. According to the majoritarian vision of democracy, what role should citizens who hold minority preferences play in determining policy?

A. They should serve as a check on the power of the majority.

B. Their opinions should be a part of a consensus that determines policy.

C. Citizens with minority preferences should have no role in the policy-making process.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

2. Government accountability gauges the extent to which it is possible to reward or punish policy makers for the policies that are chosen. Which of the following statements best characterizes accountability as a goal in both types of democracies?

A. Accountability is an important goal in both majoritarian and consensus democracies, but is only achieved in consensus democracies.

B. Accountability tends to be only an important goal for majoritarian democracies, and only majoritarian democracies achieve it.

C. Accountability is only an important goal for consensus democracies, and only consensus democracies achieve it.

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Medium

3. The ability of voters to hold their elected officials accountable depends on:

A. Voters following retrospective voting behavior

B. A sufficiently high level of clarity of responsibility

C. Both (A) and (B)

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

4. Mandates are not particularly important in consensus democracies.

Cognitive Domain: Knowledge

Difficulty Level: Easy

5. Government identifiability is higher when there are many parties but they form preelectoral coalitions than when there are many parties that only begin bargaining over government formation after elections.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

6. Which of the following institutions lead to higher levels of clarity of responsibility?

A. a federal system

B. coalition governments

C. legislative committee systems that give power to opposition parties

D. all of these

E. none of these

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Easy

7. Responsiveness is an important goal for both the majoritarian and the consensus visions of democracy, though each conceptualize the term quite differently.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

8. If a constitution writer wanted to choose institutions to disperse power and generate high levels of ideological congruence between representatives and citizens, which vision of democracy would she be trying to achieve?

A. Majoritarian

B. Consensus

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Medium

9. Which of the following countries most closely meets the guidelines of a majoritarian democracy?

A. New Zealand (prior to 1996)

B. Netherlands

C. Belgium

D. Japan

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Easy

10. Which of the following countries most closely meets the guidelines of a consensus democracy?

A. New Zealand (prior to 1996)

B. United Kingdom

C. Belgium

D. Japan

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Easy

The Effect of Political Institutions on Fiscal Policy

11. When political economists talk about fiscal policy, what are they referring to?

A. The use of taxing and spending decisions to reach government goals.

B. The set of government policies related to the raising of revenues through taxation.

C. The set of policies accomplished through government spending.

D. The manipulation of interest rates and the money supply to reach government goals.

E. All of these.

F. Only answers (A), (B), and (C) refer to fiscal policy.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Easy

12. Analysts who look at fiscal activity in advanced industrialized countries in the postwar period find that there is very little cross-national variation in the level of fiscal activity.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

13. According to the Meltzer–Richards model of the size of government, preferences over tax rates are a function of a voter’s income. Voters with a higher-than-average level of income prefer low taxes while voters with a lower-than-average income prefer high taxes.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

14. Why might the demand for redistribution that analysts find in the empirical data differ from that predicted by the Meltzer-Richards model?

A. The model assumes full turnout, so the model’s predictions should be more accurate in countries with higher levels of turnout than in other cases.

B. The model assumes income inequality, but the empirical data show no evidence of income inequality in the analyses of advanced industrialized countries presented in the chapter.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

15. Why does the partisan model of macroeconomic policy predict that changes in partisan control of the government will lead to predicable changes in fiscal policy?

A. It doesn’t; the partisan model of macroeconomic policy is about whether voters are extreme or moderate. Extreme voters want redistribution and moderate voters do not.

B. Because it assumes that left wing parties represent voters who want more redistribution (and thus, higher levels of fiscal activity) and right-wing parties represent voters who want less redistribution.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

16. Empirical evidence indicates that fiscal activity is higher in countries that use proportional representation than in ones that adopt majoritarian electoral rules.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

Electoral Laws, Federalism, and Ethnic Conflict

17. The analysis presented by Fearon and Laitin (1996) suggests that conflict is likely whenever different ethnic groups coexist within a single state.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

18. In recent years, economists and political scientists have reached a consensus regarding the exact causal relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

19. According to recent work on the size of ethnic groups and democratic stability, when are democracies likely to be particularly unstable?

A. when there are many ethnic groups

B. when there are few ethnic groups

C. when there is a permanent majority

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

20. If potential conflicts exist in ethnically divided societies, which electoral rules would political scientists recommend in order to mitigate the conflict?

A. proportional representation electoral rules.

B. majoritarian electoral rules.

C. scholars don’t agree on the best course of action in this case. Some recommend PR and others recommend majoritarian rules.

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Medium

21. Is federalism a useful tool for reducing ethnic conflict?

A. Yes. Political decentralization reduces ethnic conflict by increasing opportunities to participate in government and by giving groups discretion over their political, social, and economic affairs.

B. No. Political decentralization strengthens regionally based ethnic identities and strengthens, rather than weakens, ethnic divisions.

C. It depends. Political decentralization reduces ethnic conflict when regional parties are weak but it increases ethnic conflict when they are strong.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

22. Which of the following institutional mechanisms are thought to prevent regionally based identity parties from dominating subnational governments?

A. preferential voting systems

B. Presidential elections, where the presidency is an important political prize and the elections are held at the same time as subnational elections.

C. cross-regional voting requirements

D. all of these

Cognitive Domain: Application

Difficulty Level: Medium

Presidentialism and Democratic Survival

23. Having problems making policy quickly, locating responsibility for policy, and making comprehensive policy are characteristics of presidential systems. Parliamentary systems, particularly those with coalition governments, do not suffer from these problems.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Medium

24. If you were asked to recommend whether a poor country with a multiparty system should adopt presidentialism or parliamentarism, which would you choose? Assume that your goal is to allow them to avoid democratic collapse. Assume also that the country is unlikely to change either its level of income or its electoral rules in the near future.

A. presidentialism

B. parliamentarism

C. It wouldn’t make a difference for democratic survival in this case.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

25. If you were asked to recommend whether a rich country with a two-party system should adopt presidentialism or parliamentarism, which would you choose? Assume that your goal is to allow them to avoid democratic collapse. Assume also that the country is unlikely to change either its level of income or its electoral rules in the near future.

A. presidentialism

B. parliamentarism

C. It wouldn’t make a much of difference for democratic survival in this case, so they should use some other criteria on which to base their decision.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

26. Large numbers of veto players in a country encourage policy stability on the one hand, but political instability on the other.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Difficulty Level: Easy

27. If a moderately poor country with a high level of social heterogeneity had adopted a constitution that specified presidentialism, what kind of electoral rules would you suggest they employ in order to maximize their chances for survival as a democracy?

A. It wouldn’t matter, because they would have a multiparty system no matter the electoral rules.

B. It wouldn’t matter, because they would have a two-party system no matter the electoral rules.

C. Majoritarian (single-member district) rules so that they would have a small number of large parties.

D. Proportional representation so that they would have a small number of large parties.

E. Proportional representation so that they would have a large number of large parties.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

28. Brazil is a large, ethnically heterogeneous, primarily Catholic country. It has a presidential system with proportional representation electoral laws. Based on this description and the hypothetical regression results below, what factors about Brazil encourage political extremism? What factors discourage political extremism? Which have no effect?

Table 1: Testing Theories of Political Extremism

Dependent Variable: Level of Political Extremism

• Variables relevant to Brazil that encourage extremism: Having a large population (instead of a small one), ethnic heterogeneity, and proportional representation electoral rules (instead of SMPD).
• Variables relevant to Brazil that discourage extremism: Presidential regime.
• Variables relevant to Brazil that have no effect on extremism: Catholic majority.
• Variables that have significant coefficients but that are not mentioned in the information about Brazil given in the question: Economic development, having a large agriculture sector.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Hard

29. Drawing on discussions in various chapters throughout the textbook, can you think of reasons that might explain the regression results you began analyzing in the previous question?

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Hard

30. Venezuela is an ethnically heterogeneous country with a presidential system and a level of wealth that has been fluctuating above and below a per capita income level of $6,055 PPP USD. Although it has one of the longest records of democratic rule in Latin America, the democratic system has become increasingly fragile in recent years (indeed, many would argue that it is no longer democratic). In recent years the degree of party fractionalization in the legislature has increased and national income has fallen. In a sentence or two, what have you learned in this class that might explain the increasing fragility of democratic rule in Venezuela?

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Medium

31. In 2005, Iraq had a per capita gross domestic product of US$3,400 and derived 95% of its foreign exchange earnings from oil. The literacy rate was 40.4% compared with a global average of 82%. It has three main ethnic groups Shia Muslim (56% of the population), Sunni Muslim (28%) and Kurds (15%), which amounts to 3.1 effective ethnic groups.

Which of these factors might contribute to the emergence and survival of democracy, which ones might hinder the emergence and survival of democracy, and which do you think are irrelevant for the emergence and survival of democracy?

Finally, if you were compelled to design a constitution for Iraq that maximized the probability of democratic consolidation, which institutions would you choose? For example, would you recommend a presidential or a parliamentary regime? What electoral system would you suggest? Please indicate the reasoning (logic and evidence) behind your answer.

Part A

• Iraq’s level of income is low. Przeworski and Limongi suggest that countries above US$6,055 that experience democracy are likely to stay democracies forever. Clark argues that increased wealth is also associated with the emergence of democracy. Either way, there is nothing about Iraq’s level of wealth that would encourage the emergence or survival of democracy.
• There is considerable evidence that reliance on mineral extraction, in general, and oil extraction to be specific, discourages the emergence and survival of democracy. In addition, because oil is a highly capital intense industry, owners of such assets are not likely to possess credible exit threats. Consequently, the presence of such actors is not expected to encourage the kind of government—elite bargaining likely to lead to limited government in general, or democracy specifically.
• Iraq’s social structure contains a fair degree of ethnic/religious diversity that some have argued is bad for the emergence and survival of democracy. Chandra argues, however, that it is not ethnic diversity per se, but the existence of a “permanent minority” that is problematic for democracy (because the permanent majority might rule in such a way that leaves that group grieved and likely to view governing institutions as illegitimate). Alas, because the Shia are a majority, there is a good chance that most democratic electoral systems would make them a permanent majority and the Sunni and Kurdish minorities would have incentives to support extra-constitutional attempts to overthrow the government.

Part B

• Although the prospects for democratic survival in Iraq are grim, the choice of institutions could, at the margin, make a big difference.
• One might argue that a strong chief executive in the form of a president that is elected by all Iraq might be necessary to create national unity, but if one did, it would be important to try to ensure that the president did not confront a highly fractionalized legislature. One way to do this is to try to encourage the formation of a two-party system. We know from Duverger’s law, that single-member district plurality (SMDP) will encourage the formation of a two-party system and, given a sufficient degree of ethnic fractionalization, large district magnitude PR will encourage the formation of a multiparty system.
• Thus, although there may be good reasons to adopt PR (suppose you wanted to encourage the formation of an ambitious welfare state), If you chose presidentialism, choose an SMPD electoral system could be crucial for the survival of democracy in Iraq.
• A good answer would also include a discussion of federalism, whether and what kind ought to be adopted.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Hard

33. If you were asked to give advice on the following questions, what would your answer be?

We are writing a constitution for a new democracy in a large country with many social and ethnic cleavages and a per capita income of about US$5,000 in 1985 dollars. We would like to do everything we can to try to ensure the consolidation of our democratic regime.

First, what other goals do you think we should have in mind when writing our constitution?

Second, what advice would you give us on specific institutional forms? Proportional representation or a single-member plurality system? Should we choose a parliamentary or a presidential system? Federal or unitary system? Unicameral or bicameral legislature?

In addition to answering these questions, could you give us some sense as to how you arrived at your answers? Also, can you tell us why you think the choices you’ve recommended are compatible with each other?

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

Difficulty Level: Hard